Hundreds of pedestrians crossing the Shibuya scramble crossing in Tokyo at dusk, blurred by a long exposure
Unit 07 · All masterclasses · 70 min

Social Influence and Group Behaviour

How other people shape what we believe and do, and what the classic studies really showed
Image: Benh Lieu Song, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0

How we explain other people's behaviour, how attitudes follow actions, and why people conform, obey, and fail to help. The unit works through the data of Asch, Milgram, Festinger and Carlsmith, Darley and Latané, and Tajfel, reads the Milgram archives and the Stanford prison experiment's records, and ends with what has replicated across cultures and decades and what has not.

Preview: the beginning of the unit

In 1961 a man in a grey laboratory coat said six words, “The experiment requires that you continue”, and 26 of 40 ordinary residents of New Haven, the home town of Yale University, pressed a switch marked 450 volts. Ten years earlier, students in a room in Pennsylvania had called a short line long because seven strangers had said so first. Social psychology is the study of how the real or imagined presence of other people changes what we think, feel, and do, and its classic experiments are among the most famous in all of science, and among the most argued about, because archives, replications, and meta-analyses have changed what several of them mean. This unit presents the studies with their numbers, the variations that explain them, and what six decades of checking have left standing.

1 Social cognition

1.1 Attribution

When a colleague snaps at you, you decide within a second whether she is a rude person or has had a bad morning. The Austrian psychologist Fritz Heider (1896-1988) proposed in his book The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, published in 1958, that people act as amateur scientists who try to find the causes of behaviour, and he called this search attribution. The basic choice is between a dispositional attribution, which places the cause inside the person (her character, her ability, her mood), and a situational attribution, which places it in the circumstances (the deadline, the illness, the instruction).

Harold Kelley (1921-2003) described in 1967 how an ideal observer would choose. His covariation model says that we look at three kinds of information: consensus (do other people behave the same way towards this stimulus?), distinctiveness (does this person behave the same way towards other stimuli?), and consistency (does this person behave the same way towards this stimulus on other occasions?). To illustrate this, suppose Maria laughs loudly at a particular comedian. If almost everyone laughs at him, Maria rarely laughs at other comedians, and she laughs at him every time, all three patterns point to the comedian, and the attribution is situational. If hardly anyone else laughs at him and Maria laughs at every comedian, the patterns point to Maria, and the attribution is dispositional. McArthur (1972) gave such combinations to participants and found that their attributions mostly followed the model, with one exception that turns out to matter: consensus information, what other people do in the same situation, was used far less than the model says it should be.

This neglect of the situation is part of a general pattern, which shows most clearly when people judge others who act under a known constraint. Edward Jones and Victor Harris (1967) gave 51 students at Duke University a short essay about Fidel Castro, the communist leader of Cuba, said to be a fellow student’s examination essay. Half of the essays defended Castro and half attacked him, and half of the readers were told that the writer had chosen the side freely, while the other half were told that the examiner had assigned it. Each reader then estimated the writer’s true attitude towards Castro on a scale from 10 (extremely negative) to 70 (extremely positive), whose midpoint is 40. The following worked case reads their data.