Psychological Disorders and Their Treatment
Almost half of all adults meet the criteria for a psychological disorder at some point in their lives. This unit explains what turns sadness, fear, or strangeness into a disorder and who decides, how depression, the anxiety disorders, and schizophrenia are explained, and how randomized trials, the placebo response, the number needed to treat, and meta-analysis settle whether a treatment works, with the evidence for psychotherapy and medication side by side.
Almost half of all adults meet the criteria for a psychological disorder at some point in their lives, and most of them never see a professional about it. This unit asks three questions that every reader will meet again, in their own life or in someone else’s: what turns ordinary sadness, fear, or strangeness into a disorder, and who decides; what goes wrong in depression, in the anxiety disorders, and in schizophrenia; and how anyone can know that a treatment works, when most people who are depressed improve within a few months whether they are treated or not. The last question is the one the unit spends most time on, because it has an exact answer, and because the answer changed medicine as much as it changed psychology.
1 What makes a condition a disorder
1.1 Four signs and a definition
Textbooks often introduce the question with the four Ds. A pattern of experience or behaviour is more likely to be called a disorder when it is deviant, which means unusual in the person’s culture; when it causes distress to the person; when it produces dysfunction, which means that it interferes with work, relationships, or self-care; and when it brings danger to the person or to others. None of the four is sufficient on its own. Grief after a death is distressing and deviates from the person’s usual state, and nobody calls it a disorder. A person with a severe delusion may feel no distress at all. Danger is absent from most disorders, and present in many people who have none. The four Ds are a checklist of what clinicians attend to, and they leave the real question open.
The most influential answer to that question was given in 1992 by the philosopher and social worker Jerome Wakefield, who proposed that a disorder is a harmful dysfunction. Two things must be true at once for a condition to count as a disorder. Some psychological mechanism, such as the fear system, the mood system, or the capacity to tell inner speech from outer speech, must fail to do what it evolved to do, which is the dysfunction. And the failure must be harmful by the standards of the person’s culture. The first half is a claim about facts, and the second is a value judgement, and Wakefield’s point was that neither half can be dropped. A dysfunction that harms nobody, such as a colour-blind person who never needs to distinguish red from green, is a difference, and a harm without dysfunction, such as the fear a soldier feels under fire, is a healthy system doing its job in a terrible situation.
The two diagnostic manuals in use today both build on this idea. The DSM-5-TR, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association in its 2022 text revision, defines a mental disorder as a syndrome of clinically significant disturbance in a person’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behaviour that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes behind mental functioning, usually accompanied by distress or by disability in social or occupational life. The ICD-11, the eleventh revision of the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases, adopted in 2019 and in force since 2022, defines the same three elements in almost the same words. Both manuals add two exclusions that matter in practice. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a disorder, and conflict between a person and society, such as political or religious dissent, is not a disorder either unless it stems from a dysfunction in the person.
Why sadness after a death is not depression, and sadness after a divorce can be, is a question the manuals have answered differently over time. Until 2013 the DSM excluded a diagnosis of major depression in the first two months after a bereavement unless the symptoms were severe. The DSM-5 removed that exclusion, because the evidence showed that depression triggered by a death looks and behaves like depression triggered by anything else, and the DSM-5-TR of 2022 and the ICD-11 added a separate diagnosis of prolonged grief disorder for grief that remains disabling long after the death, after a year in the DSM-5-TR and after six months in the ICD-11. Both decisions were made by committees of clinicians and researchers on the basis of evidence, and both were contested, which shows who decides: a profession, in public, revising its own rules.
1.2 Categories or dimensions
Both manuals sort people into categories. A person either meets the criteria for major depressive disorder or does not, and the threshold is a count of symptoms over a minimum time, as Section 3 shows in detail. Categories are easy to communicate, to bill to a health insurer, and to study, and the reliability of the main diagnoses, which means the agreement between two clinicians who interview the same patient, is reasonable for most of them. The cost is that the thresholds are arbitrary. A person with four of the nine symptoms of depression is not healthy, and a person with five is not qualitatively different from them. Most of the symptoms vary along continuous dimensions in the population, and most people who meet the criteria for one disorder meet the criteria for a second, a pattern called comorbidity. In the US National Comorbidity Survey Replication, which Section 2 introduces, 45% of the people with a disorder in the past year had two or more.